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    A Noumenal Analysis of Consciousness 
                              RobertL. Latta 
   What is the relation between a sensation r more generally a conscious 
occurrence on the one hand and its neural correlate onthe  other? It is 
that of noumenon to phenomenon. The observations below, lamentably 
fragmentary, develop and defend this thesis. 
   To begin with, a noumenon is something X as X is, as opposed to 
X as X appears from this or that point of view in sense perception. 
A phenomenon is something X as X appears from a certain point of 
view in sense perception, r that appearance of X. 
   To say that wo terms constitute a  noumenon-phenomenon pair is to 
say that he latter, the alleged phenomenon, is the outcome of perceptual 
processing of the former, the alleged noumenon, by the organism in question. 
   A noumenon, then, may be said to appear. It appears in a phenomenon, 
and that phenomenon constitutes an appearance of it. It does not, of course, 
appear as noumenon. 
   Consider the following diagram: 
 PO  PS1  PS2  PS3  PS4 . . .  PSn 
                           
. . . 
    01 02 03 . . . On 
     Cl  NC1 NC2 . . .  NCn-1 
 pt.  1 2 3 4 . . .  n+1 
 PO is a physical object, event, or the like as the physicist describes it, 
 PS1 is a physical stimulus, again as the physicist describes it,  01 is an 
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organism, human or otherwise, NC1 is the neural correlate of a conscious 
occurrence, and  C1 is that conscious occurrence.  PO, then, might be a 
range of hills  and  PS1 light reflected from it, or  PO might be a cello and 
 PS1 sound waves it emits, or  PO might be a rose, or Hong Kong 
("Fragrant Harbor" in Chinese), and  PS1 odoriferous molecules it emits, 
etc. In any case, NC1 is an incidence or burst of neural firing which 
occurs in the brain of 01 in response to  PS1. 
   A device produces a visual image of NC1 on a screen, and light from 
the screen, PS2, enters the eyes of 02 and thus gives rise to NC2, a burst 
of neural firing. And so on through NCn. 
   The part of the diagram above the broken horizontal line, then, shows 
that which appears to an objective observer with a detailed panoramic view 
such as that the reader may be supposed to enjoy. The part just below the 
line, on the other hand, shows that which (though not all that which) 
occurs or appears from the standpoint of the organism in question: thus, 
 C1 from the standpoint of 01, NC1 from that of 02, and so on. 
   With reference to this diagram, then, let us consider a' series of 
 questions: 
   First, let 01 be a human being and 02 be a neurologist (no contrast 
intended). Granted that NC1 occurs or appears from the standpoint of 02, 
does it appear from that standpoint? 02 observes the workings of the 
brain of 01 with the aid of a device which shows NC1 on a screen. 
The answer, then, is yes. NC1 appears to 02 as a burst of neural firing 
in the brain of 01. It's not too much to say that he sees it there. 
   The standpoint of 02 with respect to NC1, then, constitutes a point 
of view. From that point of view, NC1 does not merely occur. Rather, it 
appears. 
   Does NC1 appear from the standpoint of 01? No, of course not. 
Unlike 02, 01 does not see a burst of neural firing. 
   Does the standpoint of 01, then, constitutea point of view on NC1? 
No, it doesn't. That which 01 perceives is  PO or  PS1, as for instance 
a cello, or simply a sound. 01, then, has a point of view on  PO or  PS1, 
but no point of view on NC1. 
   Does NC1 occur fromthe standpoint of 01? Here the answer is yes. 
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One who doubts this may perform the following experiment: Put a human 
subject, 01, in a dimly lit, quiet, featureless room, give him instructions 
to the effect hat on hearing a bell he is to report whether anything occurs, 
train him by inducing, by means of electrodes, the neural correlates of 
various sensations, as for instance of flashes of light, sounds, and odors, 
and then induce the neural correlate,  NC1, of an intense sensation, as 
for instance that of a boldly offensive odor. Surely he will report, perhaps 
quite emphatically, that something occurred. 
   From the standpoint of 01, then, NC1 occurs but does not appear. 
The implication is  obvious: From the standpoint of 01, NC1 occurs as 
it is, that is, as noumenon. 
   If asked, moreover, 01 will report hat what occurred is a sensation or 
conscious occurrence, as for instance an offensive odor, or perhaps amemory 
from his childhood. But that which occurs from his standpoint is, to repeat, 
NC1 as noumenon. Here too, then, the implication is  obvious: The con-
scious occurrence,  C1, is NC1, the burst of neural firing, as noumenon. 
   Let us note this as  follows:  C1= noumenal NC1, or for short,  C1= 
 nouNC1. 
   Let  "PO/PS1" mean  "PO or  PS1."  PO/PS1, then, appears to 01 in 
 C1, which constitutes an appearance of it. In itself  PO/PS1 is of course 
noumenal, ike anything else. Likewise, NC1/PS2 appears to 02 in noume-
nal NC2, which constitutes an appearance of it, and so on. 
   There is of course a point of view from which  PO/PS1 appears as 
such, not in C1—viz., that of the physicist. This point of view, however, 
is cognitive, not perceptual—fundamentally at any rate—and shall be left 
out of account here. 
   Phenomenal  PO/PS1, then, is  PO/PS1 as it appears to 01—that is to 
say, in Cl. For clarity of exposition, however, it might be best to forgo 
"noumenal  PO/PS1" in favor of  "PO/PS1.  " 
   Phenomenal  PO/PS1 is  C1, which, to repeat, is noumenal NC1: 
 phePO/PS1=  Cl=nouNC1. Thus, for instance, the physical sound the 
cello emits as 01 hears it (phenomenal  PS1) is the sound he hears  (C1) 
is the neural correlate of the sound he hears as noumenon (noumenal NC1). 
   Phenomenal NC1, which is to say  NC1 the burst of neural firing as 
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it appears to 02, is noumenal NC2. That is, just as noumenal NC1 is 
phenomenal  PO/PS1—as for instance  PS1 the physical sound as it appears, 
in the auditory mode—noumenal NC2 is NC1 the burst of neural firing as 
it appears, in the visual mode. Similarly, phenomenal NC2 is noumenal 
NC3, phenomenal NC3 is noumenal NC4, and so on. Thus,  phePO/PS1= 
 nouNC1,  pheNC1=nouNC2,  pheNC2  =  nouNC3  pheNCn-1=nouNCn. 
   The fact that  phePO/PS1=nouNC1, and so on, explains why it is 
natural to define a phenomenon asabove: "something X as X appears from a 
certain point of view in sense perception, or that appearance of  X.  " 
Phenomenal  PO/PS1 is something X as X appears from a certain point of 
view in sense perception, and noumenal NC1 is that appearance of X. 
   It is possible to recognize all the following: (1) noumenal  Cl, the 
conscious occurrence as such; (2) phenomenal C , the conscious occurrence 
as it appears—viz., as a burst of neural firing; (3) noumenal  NC1, the burst 
of neural firing as it is, not as it appears; and (4) phenomenal  NC1, the 
burst of neural firing as it appears—that is, from the point of view of 02 on 
01. With reference to the part of the diagram which lies below the 
horizontal line, then, Cl is noumenal t point 2, as Cl, and phenomenal t
point 3, as NC1. That is to say, noumenal Cl is shown at point 2 as Cl, 
and phenomenal  C1at point 3 as NC1. Similarly, NC1 is noumenal t point 
2, as  Cl, and phenomenal tpoint 3, as NC1, or in other words noumenal 
NC1 is shown at point 2 as Cl, and phenomenal NC1 at point 3 as NC1. 
 C1 or NC1, then, is noumenal or phenomenal depending on the point in 
the diagram which is in question. For clarity of exposition, however, it 
might be best to forgo "noumenal Cl" in favor of  "Cl,  " and "phenomenal 
 Cl" in favor of  "NC1" or "phenomenal  NC1,  " as in the diagram. 
   To speak simply of NC1, as opposed to noumenal or phenomenal 
NC1, is  to lay aside talk of noumena nd phenomena and speak instead 
of the world we see around us. But this means that unmodified "NC1" is 
to be understood to denote phenomenal NC1. 
   In the following, the thesis that Cl is noumenal from the standpoint 
of 01, that it is something X as X is, not as X appears, hall be called the 
noumenalist thesis, or for short the N-thesis. The thesis that Cl is 
phenomenal from the point of view of 01, that it is something X as X 
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appears, shall be called the phenomenalist thesis, or for short the P-thesis. 
Either the N-thesis is true of the P-thesis is; there is no further alternative. 
From the standpoint of 01, either  C1 is something X as X is, or it is 
something X as X appears. The falsity of the P-thesis, then, entails the truth 
of the N-thesis and vice versa. 
   One of the main arguments for the N-thesis lies in the fact that it is 
minimalist, whereas the P-thesis runs afoul of Ockham's razor. On the 
N-thesis, only two factors figure in the case: (1) Cl , the burst of neural 
firing in the brain of 01 as it is not as it appears; and (2) NC1, that 
burst as it appears. On the P-thesis, in contrast, three factors figure: (1) 
 Cl, something X as X appears from the point of view of 01; (2) NC1, 
X as X appears from the point of view of 02; and (3) X or more than 
three factors, if NC1 X. But this "multiplication of entities" accomplishes 
nothing and hence goes "beyond  necessity.  " 
    Here are two further arguments: Let  PS1consist in sound waves of a 
certain amplitude and frequency and  Cl consist in sound of a certain 
loudness and pitch. Then  C1 does not appear as sound of that loudness and 
pitch, for that which does so is  PS1. If, however,  C1 does not appear as 
sound of the loudness and pitch in question, then, clearly, it doesn't appear 
at all.  C1, then, occurs but does not appear: it is noumenal. 
   Again, a field of blue might be the Montana sky in April, the 
Xianjiang sky in October, or something else not a sky at all. Clearly, at 
least potentially, the sensation in question is the medium, as it were, of 
indefinitely many different phenomena. Similarly for every other sensation. 
Sensation as such, then, does not represent. But this is to say that in itself 
it does not constitute the appearance of anything, and this in turn entails 
that it is noumenal, not phenomenal. 
   A question suggests  itself: Let Cl be a sensation, as for instance a 
taste, as of wine. Then  C1 has various sensory properties. If 01 has the 
requisite cognitive and expressive capacities, he will be able to describe 
those properties. On the present analysis of consciousness, however, Cl 
is noumenal from the standpoint of 01, and hence  C1 does not appear to 01. 
How, then, is it possible that something which does not appear has sensory 
properties? 
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   To put it differently, how is it that one can know what a sensation, 
as for instance one's twinge of pain, is like as noumenon, but cannot know 
what anything else is like as noumenon—where to know what something 
is like is to know in sensory terms? 
   The answer lies in the fact that sensation is the medium, the very 
stuff, of consciousness. 
   Consider an analogy—though like any other analogy it must be han-
dled with care: An artist working in oils can show you what his paints are 
like, i. e., what the colors are, by pointing them out on his palette. It's not 
necessary for him to paint a picture of anything to show you and would 
in fact be pointless to do so. On the other hand, to show you what anything 
else is like, he must paint a picture (he can, of course, simply point out 
something in your surroundings, but this fact is dysanalogous, to be set 
aside). The picture, of course, is not the thing itself—is not the picturesque 
harbor, for  instance—but rather the thing as it appears. The artist, then, can 
show you what his paints are like but not what anything else is like 
without painting anything because he is using those paints as his medium. 
Sensations, then, are analogous to the artist's  paints  : One can know what 
they are like as noumena but cannot know what anything else is like as 
noumenon because they are the medium of consciousness—that is, of the 
range of consciousness in question, whatever ange that might be. 
   It is less than obvious that a conscious occurrence is noumenal. But 
why so? 
    There are, perhaps, several reasons. There is, to begin with, a train of 
thought which runs as  follows: A noumenon is a "something I know not 
 what,  " whereas a conscious occurrence—as for instance a sensation—is a
"something I know very well what"; hence a conscious occurrence is not 
noumenal. This, however, fails, of course, as a riposte to the present 
analysis. 
    Again, in his article on the term "noumenon" in The Oxford 
Dictionary of Philosophy, Simon Blackburn  writes  :
     On a different view [of Kant's metaphysics], the  [noumenon-phe-
     nomenon) distinction merely reflects Kant's undertanding that all 
     knowledge is knowledge from a standpoint, so the noumenal is the 
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     fraudulent idea of that which would be apprehendedby abeing with 
     no point of view (265). 
This train of thought entails, of course, that nothing is noumenal. "The 
idea of that which would be apprehended bya being with no point of  view,  " 
however, is not entirely "fraudulent,  " for 01, to repeat, has no point of view 
of  C1, yet "apprehends"  Cl in the sense that if he has sufficient cognitive 
capacity and applies it, he knows what  C1 is like. 
    Again, consider the term "mental phenomena" s applied to sensations, 
conscious tates, and the like. Perhaps the reasoning is that the things in 
question occur, so it is fair to label them phenomena, nd this is of 
course so provided that a phenomenon is understood tobe simply something 
that occurs. 
    Consider too the expression "a phenomenal  sound,  " for instance. A 
phenomenal sound is indeed phenomenal in one respect, viz., as a pheno-
menon, an appearance, ofa physical object or sound, but it is noumenal in 
another, viz., as a sensation. The assertion "A phenomenal sound is 
 noumenal,  " however, though quite true understood correctly, appears para-
doxical if not absurd. 
   Then again, consider the following circumstance: There is no quali-
tative difference between a sensation or complex of sensations as such, and 
that same thing as an appearance of something. You look straight up at the 
blue Montana sky, for instance. Your entire visual field is filled with blue. 
There is no qualitative difference between this blue as a sensation and this 
blue as the Montana sky. The Montana sky, however, is phenomenal— 
it is something X as X appears—and thus it is easy to conclude that 
the sensation is too. 
   To turn very briefly to the question of intentionality, a professional 
cellist is with her neonate son. A cello sounds from a nearby room, out 
of sight. The cellist hears a cello, and the neonate hears a sound. Despite 
the grammatical parallel between "hears a cello" and "hears a  sound,  " 
however, it cannot be said that the neonate hears something in the sense in 
which the cellist does. She hears something in that something appears to 
her—viz., a cello—whereas nothing appears to him. He hears neither a 
cello nor a physical sound, for he has no conception of either. He 
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"hears a sound" only in the sense that he has a sensation of a certain 
description though he has no inkling that he has it or that it is of that 
description, a sound. Her conscious state, then, entails a phenomenon, in 
the sense that a phenomenon, the cello as it appears to her, figures in it, 
whereas his does not entail any phenomenon but merely a noumenon. 
Her conscious state, however, is intentional precisely in that it entails a 
phenomenon, and his is not precisely in that it does not. But this suggests 
that to say that a conscious state is intentional is simply to say that it 
entails phenomena, not merely noumena—that is, where it is perception 
not cognition that is in question. 
   A conscious state which entails phenomena nd hence is intentional, 
however, is noumenal no less than one which doesn't and hence isn't. It 
is not the cellist's conscious state but rather the cello which appears to her. 
   The cellist might indeed reflect on her conscious tate. That is, she might 
introspect. The term  "introspection,  " however, is a misnomer. The cellist, 
01, does not, again, perceive her conscious state, Cl. Introspection is not 
a matter of looking in, but rather one of thinking about, not a matter of 
perception but rather one of cognition. 
    A conscious occurrence is a conscious noumenon. It is noumenal but 
figures in consciousness. It figures as a medium of phenomena, and for that 
matter as a medium of cognition. 
   The domain of the mental is the domain of conscious occurrences, 
conscious noumena. The domain of the physical, in contrast, is that 
of phenomena—i. e., it is the domain of that which appears in sense 
perception. 
   A doubt might well arise: According to the present analysis, when a 
neurologist observes a burst of neural firing NC1 in a brain, that which he 
observes is in itself  C1, as for instance the fragrance of a rose. But is this 
possible? Is it possible that his visual system processes the fragrance of a 
rose, and that in consequence he observes a burst of neural firing in a 
brain? Isn't this preposterous? Doesn't it amount to a reductio of the 
analysis? 
    No, it isn't and it doesn't. The neurologist's ubject, 01, puts his nose 
to a rose, and the outcome is NC1, a burst of neural firing, which, however, 
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as it occurs from his standpoint is the fragrance of a rose. In turn, the 
neurologist, 02, puts his eyes, as it were, to that which occurs in his 
subject's brain, viz., NC1 the just-mentioned burst of neural firing, and the 
outcome is NC2, which, however, as it occurs from his standpoint is the 
sight of a burst of neural firing. His visual system, then, does indeed 
process that which in itself, as noumenon, is the fragrance of a rose, and 
the upshot is indeed that he observes a burst of neural firing in a brain. 
   Usage, both everyday and technical, reflects the fact that a conscious 
occurrence is noumenal. We say, for instance, that the sky is blue, but 
that the sensation is of blue. Why? In the first case "blue" is an adjective, 
but in the second it is a noun: hence the "of. " This reflects the fact that 
the sky is phenomenal and the sensation noumenal—though it falls far 
short, of course, of proving it. The adjective "blue" is used to say how 
something appears and the noun "blue" to say what something is. 
   There is a language of phenomena: "appears to  be,  " "looks  like,  " 
"sounds  like
,  " "tastes  good,  " "smells  funny,  " etc. In speaking of conscious 
occurrences, conscious noumena, however, theorists tend strongly to avoid 
it, as they should. Thomas Nagel's "what it is  like,  " on the other hand, is 
approprate. 
   The present analysis may be said to yield an identity theory, and not 
to yield one. 
   On the one hand, clearly, an object as it appears—a building, for 
instance—is that object, or at any rate this is so in the normal case. On the 
other hand, equally clearly, the appearance is one thing and the object 
another. A phenomenon is the noumenon of which it is a phenomenon as 
that noumenon appears, but is not that noumenon. A burst of neural firing 
which is the neural correlate of a sensation, then, is that sensation, which 
is noumenal, as it appears, but is not that sensation. 
   Is the sensation, then, identical to the burst of neural firing, or is it 
not? This question is illegitimate. The distinction between the sensation as 
it appears, as phenomenon, and the sensation as such, as noumenon, is 
legitimate, but the answer to the question of identity is different depending on 
whether it is the sensation as phenomenon or as noumenon that is intended. 
    On the present analysis, then, in one way, a conscious occurrence is 
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numerically identical to its neural correlate, and in another way it is 
numerically diverse from it:  Cl=pheC1 in that the latter is the former as 
the former appears, but  C1*pheC1, in that the latter is not the former 
as the former is. 
   To take a suggestion from P. F. Strawson, to say that an event does not 
occur in the one unitary objective world is to say that it doesn't occur at all. 
Anything that occurs, then, occurs in that world, or is identical to some-
thing that occurs there. Now a twinge of pain  C1, for instance, occurs. 
As such, however, it does not occur in the one objective world. Hence it is 
identical to some event that does occur there. The only objective vent to 
which it might be identical, however, is  NC1, which is to say phenomenal 
 NCI. Hence it is indeed the case that  Cl=pheNCl. 
   On the other hand, consider the following chain of  inference: 
     (1)  C1=nouNC1 
      (2)  pheNCl=nouNC2 
     (3) nouNC  1  nouNC2 
     (4)  nouN  C  1  pheN  C  1 (2, 3) 
     (5) C1pheNC1 (1,4)
Just as  pheNC1  pheNC2,  nouNC1  nouNC2 and  C1  pheNCL This, 
however, is straightforward numerical diversity. Hence it is indeed the case 
that  Cl  pheNC1. 
   Phenomenal NC1 is noumenal NC1 as the latter appears. In one way, 
then, the noumenon-phenomenon relation entails numerical identity. But, 
as shown in the chain of inference just above (step 4),  nouNClEpheNCl. 
In another way, then, the noumenon-phenomenon relation does not entail 
numerical identity. Again, the phenomenon is the noumenon as the 
noumenon appears, but is not the noumenon. 
   Let  "-->" mean "causes" or "gives rise  to.  " Then  PS1  —>-  Cl, or in 
other words  PS1  nouNCL It is also the case, however, that  PS1 
 pheNC1. But  C1*pheNCl, or in other words  nouNCl*pheNCL Is 
there a problem here? 
   No, there isn't. To assert hat  PS1  Cl is to presuppose that the 
standpoint in the case is that of 01, whereas to assert hat  PS1  pheNC1 
is to presuppose that the standpoint is that of 02. Thus, given  PS1, that 
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which occurs from the standpoint of 01 is  C1, but that which occurs 
from the standpoint—appears from the point of view—of 02 is NC1. 
   Now consider the following chain of inference: 
      (1)  PS1-+nouNCl 
     (2) Cl=  nouNC1 
     (3)  PS1-+C1 (1, 2) 
      (4)  PS2-+nouNC2 
      (5) C2= nouNC2 
    (6)  PS2—*C2 (4, 5) 
      (7)  nouNC2=pheNCl 
     (8) PS2-+pheNC1 (4, 7) 
Lines 3 and 6 severally entail that something physical gives rise to something 
mental. So, though less clearly, do lines 1, 4, and 8. The justification for 
line 1 is that  PS1 gives rise to NC1 and ipso facto to noumenal NC1, and 
similarly for line 4. 
   Is it possible in principle to infer the nature of a conscious occurrence 
from that of its neural correlate, and if not why not? 
   To do so is to infer the nature of noumenal NC1 from that of phenomenal 
NC1. Now in principle, it is indeed possible to arrive at a knowledge of the 
nature of noumenal NC1 given phenomenal NC1, but it is necessary to 
take the following step: Induce a duplicate of NC1 in your own brain—if 
this is impossible in that your brain happens to include no structure of the 
requisite type, attach a new lobe to make it possible—and ote what occurs. 
(You could, of course, induce NC1 in the brain of another person instead 
and ask him to describe noumenal  NC1, which is to say that which he 
experiences, but this comes down to the same thing and hence has no 
bearing on the  argument.  ) It is impossible to dispense with this step in that 
noumenal NC1 occurs only from the standpoint of the organism in whose 
brain NC1 occurs. It follows, however, than an examination of NC1 as it 
appears does not suffice, and that no inference from the information it 
yields can possibly ield the information sought, for an inference from that 
information does not, of course, in any way entail the essential step. The 
answer, then, is no. 
    Here is a further argument to the same conclusion: To repeat,  Cl  = 
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 nouNC1 and  pheNC1=  nouNC2. To infer the nature of a conscious 
occurrence  C1 from that of its neural correlate NC1, then, is to infer the 
nature of noumenal NC1 from that of noumenal NC2. It is, for instance, 
to infer the odor of Hong Kong from the sight of a burst of neural firing. 
It's obvious, however, that this is impossible—though with practice one might 
learn to "read" sensations from bursts of neural firing. The former, the 
odor, is the outcome of taking in the air of Hong Kong, and the latter, the 
sight of a burst of neural firing, the outcome of observing the workings of 
a brain. There is simply no connection here. 
   To determine whether a candidate neural correlate is indeed the neural 
correlate of a conscious occurrence—that is, of some conscious occurrence or 
other—it is necessary to take the step described above. If the candidate 
neural correlate is markedly incongruous with the structure of your brain, 
however, this might prove impossible. 
   To turn the question around, is it possible in principle to infer the 
nature of the neural correlate of a conscious occurrence from that of the 
conscious occurrence itself? 
   It is indeed possible to arrive at a knowledge of the nature of the neural 
correlate given a conscious occurrence  Cl, but it is necessary to take the 
following step: Examine the neural correlate, NC1, of Cl in the brain of 
01. It is impossible to dispense with this step in that NC1 appears only 
from the point of view of 02 on 01. But it follows that an introspective 
examination of Cl  does not suffice, and that no inference from the 
information it yields can possibly  yield the information sought, for an 
inference from that information does not, of course, in any way entail the 
essential step. Here too, then, the answer is no. 
   Here is another argument, perhaps better, to the same conclusion: 
Within the domain here in question, that of perception as opposed to 
cognition, a sensation or more generally a conscious occurrence carries 
information about that, if anything, of which it is a phenomenon, an 
appearance, and about nothing else. In itself, it is like a dab of paint on the 
painter's palette in that it carries no information at all. It is not, however, 
a phenomenon of its neural correlate, but rather the noumenon of it, and 
hence carries no information about it. 
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    To move to a quite different point, to speak in terms of a conscious 
agent and its behavior  (".  . the taste is foul, so the animal spits out the 
fruit") is to speak in terms of conscious noumena—that is to say, insofar 
as consciousness figures in the case. In contrast, to speak in terms of 
physical mechanism (with reference tothe same case:  "..  .  the afferent series 
of bursts of neural firing gives rise to the efferent series, which in turn 
causes these movements in the lungs, throat, and mouth") is to speak entirely 
in terms phenomena. It is possible, however, to speak in terms of conscious 
noumena and cause-and-effect relations at once  (".  . the unpleasant, 
aversive character of the taste causes the animal to spit out the fruit"), 
in that it is possible to regard a conscious noumenon as a cause, which is so, 
again, in that  C1=  pheC1. 
    In this example, that which appears—one s ries then another of neural 
firing, then movements in the lungs, throat, and mouth—is all that occurs. 
The foul taste occurs, to be sure, but it is identical to a burst of neural 
firing in the afferent series—to ne at the end of the series, presumably—in 
that it is that burst as that burst is. There is no possibility, then, that the 
series of events described partly in terms of conscious noumena (as in "... 
the taste is foul, so the animal spits out the fruit") and that described 
entirely in terms of phenomena  ("..  . the afferent series of bursts of neural 
firing gives rise to the efferent series, which in turn causes these movements 
in the lungs, throat, and mouth") might fail to match or mesh in some way, 
for there occurs only series of events. 
   Ralph Ellis mentions 
     a certain  'phenomenological fallacy' which consists of thinking that if 
     I see a green thing, then there must be something reen in my brain
     (An Ontology of Consciousness, 46). 
This is indeed a fallacy. It is the fallacy of supposing that a conscious 
noumenon, as for instance a flash of green, appears as it is, not as it 
appears, which is of course nonsense. In fact it appears at it appears, as a 
burst of neural firing, not as it is. 
   To put it differently, the phenomenological fallacy is that of classifying a
sensation or more generally a conscious occurrence as a phenomenon not a 
noumenon. If a conscious occurrence, a flash of green, for instance, is a 
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phenomenon, then, to speak absurdly, it appears in that phenomenon, as
a flash of green. But this is to say that it appears as a flash of green from the 
point of view of 02 on 01, the point of view of a neurologist observing the 
workings of a brain. 
   The P-thesis, then, entails the phenomenological f lacy. This, of 
course, constitutes a strong argument against it and for the N-thesis. 
   John R. Searle  writes  :
     Just as the liquidityof  ... water is caused by the behavior of 
     elements at the micro-level, and yet at the same time it is a feature 
     realised in the system of micro-elements, so in exactly that sense of 
 `caused by' and  'realised in' mental phenomena are caused by processes 
     going on in the brain at the neuronal or modular level, andat the 
     same time they are realised in the very system that consistsof 
     neurons (Minds, Brains and Science, 22). 
That which occurs in a brain on the macro-level, however, no less than that 
which occurs on the micro-level, is phenomenal: it is what appears from an 
objective point of view. Searle's theory, then, entails—or at any rate appears 
to entail—that 02 can literally see Cl in the brain of 01, not only as NC1, 
a burst of neural firing, on the micro-level, but also as  C1—as, for instance, 
a flash of green, the sound of a cello, or the odor of Hong Kong—on the 
macro-level. But, leaving aside the question what it means to see a pheno-
menal sound or an odor, if not to see the neural correlate, which on Searle's 
theory consists in a burst of neural firing on the micro-level, this is to 
commit he phenomenological  fal acy: A neurologist observes the workings 
of the brain of an organism as it experiences a flash of green, and what 
does he see there? On the micro-level, a burst of neural firing, and on the 
macro-level a flash of green. 
    No theory of consciousness which takes an objective point of view 
on an organism and fails to take into account that organism's own standpoint 
can possibly capture the consciousness of that organism. This point of 
view is that of 02 on 01. From it, noumenal NC1 appears, as a burst of 
neural firing, but it does not occur as noumenon. This point of view, then, 
does not capture noumenal  NC1. But this is to say that it doesn't capture 
 Cl, for  Cl  =nouNC1. 
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   Searle's theory, for instance, takes the point of view of 02 on 01 and 
fails to take into account the standpoint of 01 , and thus captures no more 
than that which figures in the case as phenomenon. Thus it fails to capture 
that which figures as noumenon. Hence it fails to capture the consciousness 
of 01. 
   Consciousness, then, consists in neural firing of certain descriptions— 
not, however, as it appears, which is to say not as neural firing
, but rather 
as it is. To summarize with a slogan, consciousness is noumenal.
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